Securities Regulation-Federal Anti-Fraud Provisions-Applicability of Insider Responsibility to Broker in Possession of Inside Corporate Information by Krsul, John A., Jr.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 5 
1962 
Securities Regulation-Federal Anti-Fraud Provisions-Applicability 
of Insider Responsibility to Broker in Possession of Inside 
Corporate Information 
John A. Krsul Jr. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John A. Krsul Jr., Securities Regulation-Federal Anti-Fraud Provisions-Applicability of Insider 
Responsibility to Broker in Possession of Inside Corporate Information, 60 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1962). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss5/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1962] RECENT DECISIONS 651 
SECURITIES REGULATION-FEDERAL ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS-APPLICA-
BILITY OF INSIDER R.EsPONSIBILITY TO BROKER IN POSSESSION OF INSIDE 
CORPORATE INFORMATION-During a period of upward movement in the 
price of Curtiss-Wright common stock, the corporation's board of directors 
voted to reduce the stock dividend by forty percent, an action certain to have 
an immediate adverse effect upon the stock's market price. Although the 
board immediately authorized the transmission of information concerning 
its action to the New York Stock Exchange,! an inadvertent delay of 
forty-five minutes ensued. Unaware of the delay, C, a director of Curtiss-
Wright and a registered representative of Cady, Roberts & Co. (registrant) , 
a registered broker-dealer,2 telephoned registrant to inform G, one of its 
partners, of the dividend reduction. G, knowing that this information had 
not yet been publicized, took advantage of his knowledge by quickly selling 
on the New York Stock Exchange 9,700 shares of the Curtiss-Wright stock 
for the discretionary accounts of his customers. Thirty minutes later the 
news of the dividend reduction reached the Exchange and the price of 
Curtiss-Wright stock immediately dropped by almost four points. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission instituted disciplinary proceedings 
against G and registrant to determine whether the sale violated the 
federal "anti-fraud" provisions:3 section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 
1933,4 section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 and rule 
IOb-5.6 Held, both G and registrant7 are subject to sanctions8 for will-
fully violating these provisions. Although the "anti-fraud" provisions have 
traditionally imposed a duty of disclosure upon "insiders," they also are 
applicable to any person enjoying a special relationship whereby he has 
access to confidential corporate information. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC 
Security Exchange Act Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961), CCH 1961 FED. 
SEC. L. REP. i 76803. 
At common law a private investor ordinarily had no duty to disclose 
material information in his possession that might affect the price of stock 
1 The Exchange requires an immediate public release of dividend information by an 
issuer. Article III (4), Form of Listing Agreement, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL 
A-28 (1953) • 
2 Registrant was registered in compliance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
§ 15 (b), amended by 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1958). 
3 The case was heard under an offer of settlement that stipulated as to both the facts 
and the penalty. Administrative Procedure Act § 5 (b), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1004 (b) (1958); SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.8 (Supp. 1962). 
4 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1958). 
5 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958). 
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949). 
7 Registrant was found to be in violation because G acted in connection with his 
duties as a partner of registrant. See H. F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833 (1948) • 
s The SEC accepted G's and registrant's offer of settlement which provided that G 
be suspended from the New York Stock Exchange for twenty days and that no action 
be taken against registrant. 
652 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
involved in a transaction to which he was a party.9 Of greater importance, 
perhaps, was the status of corporate "insiders" (e.g., directors, officers and 
controlling shareholders10) who utilized corporate information in such 
transactions. In a majority of states there was no duty for an "insider" to 
disclose such information to the other party to the transaction, although 
he was considered to be liable to the corporation for his action.11 Even in 
the "minority rule" 12 and "special facts"13 jurisdictions, where there was a 
duty to disclose, breach of which would render the insider liable for dam-
ages to the defrauded party, only a defrauded vendor14 who did not sell 
on an exchange15 could hope to prevail. The net result of this diversity 
at the common law was that private investors were not fully protected 
from misuse of information by insiders. Partially in recognition of this, 
Congress enacted securities legislation designed to impose sanctions against 
abuse of position by insiders and to encourage a wider dissemination of 
information concerning corporate activity and financial status.16 
Probably the most effective and encompassing federal weapon resulting 
from the securities legislation is rule lOb-5.17 Its terms are almost identical 
to those of section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, although it supple-
ments that section by prohibiting fraudulent conduct in purchases as well 
as sales of securities. It has often been recognized that rule I0b-5 is not 
limited by common law standards of what constitutes fraud.18 Certainly, 
it imposes upon an insider a duty to disclose material corporate informa-
tion when dealing in that corporation's stock.19 On the other hand, a 
9 3 Loss, SECURlTIES REGULATION 1430-33 (2d ed. 1961). 
10 While most common law cases dealt with directors and officers, recent cases under 
federal legislation also recognize the controlling shareholder as an insider. E.g., Perlman 
v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Zahn v. 
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) . 
11 E.g., Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) . 
12 E.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903) • 
13 E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
14 No cases can be found at the common law imposing liability on a selling insider 
who would otherwise have a duty to disclose. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1454-55 {2d 
ed. 1961). 
15 Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). 
16 See H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) ; S. REP. No. 792, 7lld Cong., 
2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55, 68 (1934) . 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949). "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails, or· of any facility of any national securities exchange (a) to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 
18 E.g., Norris &: Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949) . 
19 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), afj'd on Te-
hearing, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952). It is well 
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subject of frequent speculation has been whether-and to what extent-
rule IOb-5, phrased in terms of "any person," imposes upon outsiders the 
insider's duty to disclose material information.20 Clearly, both outsiders 
and insiders are within the scope of rule IOb-5 (b) when there have been 
representations and statements incident to fraudulent conduct.21 However, 
problems arise when, as in the principal case, there has been silence in 
connection with a transaction.22 With respect to this problem, it has been 
held that a broker who knows of an insider's scheme to defraud the public 
must disassociate himself from the transaction or be liable for fraud under 
rule IOb-5.23 Moreover, there has been some indication that an outsider 
who gains access to confidential inside information as a result of business 
negotiations or transactions with a corporation becomes subject to a duty 
to disclose this information when dealing with that corporation's stock.24 
Nevertheless, until the principal case, the issue raised by an outsider's use of 
inside corporate information had not been squarely faced.25 
In the principal case the SEC, in finding that G, an outsider, had vio-
lated the federal "anti-fraud" provisions, was content to base its analysis 
on the language of rule IOb-5 (c), which provides that it shall be unlawful 
for any person "to engage in any act, practice or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . ."26 
The Commission pointed out that the statutory duty to disclose, although 
traditionally applied to insiders, entailed two important elements: (I) the 
existence of a special relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended for a corporate purpose rather than for anyone's per-
sonal benefit; and (2) the inherent unfairness involved in using such in-
formation when dealing with another.27 The fact that C was connected 
with Curtiss-Wright as a director and with G's firm as a registered repre-
settled that a defrauded investor can base a chil action for damages on rule IOb-5. 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Ellis v. Carter, 
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). It must nevertheless be shown that the plaintiff was dire,tly 
injured by the wrongdoer as the result of a stock transaction. Birnbaum v. Newport 
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
20 E.g., Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950); Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429 (1951). 
21 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445 n.l (2d ed. 1961) • 
22 In regard to liability under rule IOb-5 (a) , one court commented that "silence can-
not be deemed to be the employment of 'any device, scheme or artifice' •.•. " Joseph v. 
Farnsworth Radio &: Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afj'd, 198 
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) • 
23 Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; cf. In re Hughes &: Treat, 
22 S.E.C. 623, 626 (1946) • 
24 Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (investigation report) • 
211 Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (elements of common law 
fraud present) ; Ward La France Truck Corp., supra note 24 (investigation report) ; cf. 
Alexander Smith, 22 S.E.C. 13 (1946) • 
26 Principal case, CCH 1961 FED. SEc. L. REP. ,r 76803, at 81017. 
21 Ibid. 
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sentative was deemed to put G in the position of having such a "special 
relationship" making him privy to Curtiss-Wright's internal affairs, while 
G's use of the information transmitted by C was considered sufficiently 
unfair to impose sanctions. Indeed, the SEC considered the unfairness so 
great that the only available alternative to disclosure of confidential infor-
mation was found to be a complete cancellation of the transaction.28 
It is clear that the principal case establishes a new standard for pro-
moting and enforcing fair dealing in stock transactions. However, the 
future effectiveness of this policing device rests in large part upon the 
meaning of the "special relationship" concept and the limits on the stand-
ard which might be imposed by it. The problem can be illustrated by 
examining the limitations of the concept. If, for example, an employee of 
a corporation did work that put him in contact with confidential informa-
tion it is likely that his employment relationship would subject him to the 
obligations of rule IOb-5.29 The apparent liability of an outsider who 
transacts business with a corporation and picks up confidential information 
in the process has already been discussed, and this, too, appears to be a 
"special relationship." Moreover, the SEC would likely be unwilling to 
allow a member of an insider's family to exploit information in a manner 
prohibited to the insider himself.30 The more difficult task comes in apply-
ing the requirement of a "special relationship" to an outsider who has no 
employment, business or family connections with a corporation or its in-
siders. For example, what if the corporate director in the principal case 
had not been associated with registrant, the facts merely indicating a 
friendly call to G? Absent the business ties, it would be stretching the term 
"special relationship" to its conceptual limits to apply it to a relationship 
based solely on personal friendship.31 Even more extreme is the situation 
where an outsider has gained confidential information as a result of over-
hearing a conversation between insiders. Here there would clearly be no 
"special relationship" to bring the outsider within the holding of the SEC 
in the principal case. Yet, the language of rule I 0b-5 is broad in scope: 
"any person" who engages in "any" act or practice resulting in fraud or 
deceit has thereunder acted unlawfully. Thus, it is submitted that even 
in the absence of a "special relationship" it would be unlawful for an out-
sider to utilize confidential information without disclosure. The essential 
factor is the possession of confidential information by an outsider rather 
28 Ibid. 
29 Cf. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (employee liable 
to corporation). But see Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921). 
30 See In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947) (wife); Bemer v. 
Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949) (brother-in-law). See also In re 
Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944, 951 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturer's Trust 
Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949) . 
31 But see REsrATEM:ENT, REsrlTUTION § 201 (2) (1937) . 
1962] RECENT DECISIONS 655 
than the existence of a "special relationship." This is not to contend, as 
respondents apparently did,32 that the duty to disclose would be extended 
to include information gleaned by an outsider through independent market 
analysis. The SEC made it clear that information intended only for cor-
porate purposes must have reached the outsider directly or indirectly from 
a corporation source before any duties under rule IOb-5 would arise.as 
The main problem confronting the SEC would then appear to be prov-
ing that the outsider in fact obtained and used specific confidential corpo-
rate information in the transaction in question. This was not a problem 
in the principal case since there was an offer of settlement in which the 
respondents submitted a conclusive statement of facts indicating that C 
passed confidential information to G. However, in the face of denials by 
the parties that any such conduct occurred, the difficulties involved in 
acquiring direct proof of wrongdoing could provide a substantial barrier to 
enforcement. The crucial issue for the future, therefore, appears to revolve 
around the effect that will be given to circumstantial evidence of fraudulent 
conduct. The evidentiary difficulties are well illustrated by the facts of the 
principal case, which revealed that before the Curtiss-Wright board of di-
rectors voted to reduce the stock dividend, G had already sold 6,500 shares 
of Curtiss-Wright stock as a result of an earlier decision to liquidate that 
stock from his discretionary accounts. Certainly, the further sale by G of 
another 9,700 shortly after the board's decision would not be as clearly 
tinged with fraud as when no sales had previously been made. In a similar 
vein, it would seem that when a member or representative of the alleged 
wrongdoer firm is also a member of the involved corporation's board of 
directors, there would be a stronger presumption of fraud. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that the association of a director with a 
brokerage partnership does not impute the director's knowledge of cor-
porate affairs to the partnership simply because it deals in the corporation's 
securities.34 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that rule IOb-5 has given the 
SEC an impressive vehicle for promoting and enforcing fair dealing in 
securities transactions, the future effectiveness of the Commission's ruling 
in the principal case may well depend on the standards of proof which 
will be required thereunder. I h A K: l J o n . rsu, r. 
32 Brief for Respondent, pp. 28-29, principal case. 
as Principal case, CCH 1961 Fm. SEc L. REP. 1f 7680!1, at 81017. 
M Blau v. Lehman, !168 U.S. 40!1 (1962); see Rattner v. Lehman, 19!1 F.2d 564 (2d 
Cir. 1952). 
